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Fuentes requires that the defendant receive notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard prior to any attachment of his property. Absent
extraordinary circumstances, the court will be afforded an opportunity
to balance the respective rights of the plaintiff and the defendant with
the aid of information supplied by both parties to the action.
The need for a complete legislative reevaluation of provisional
remedies can readily be seen as a priority of the first magnitude.
Fuentes v. Shevin requires nothing less. Respect for the constitutional
rights of the defendant and the availability of effective remedies for the
plaintiff are not concepts which are mutually exclusive. Within the
framework of Fuentes v. Shevin ample opportunity exists to strike a
balance equitable to both.
INSURANCE LAW

Ins. Law § 167(1)(b): Court incorporatesseparate proceeding against
insurance carrierinto underlying negligence action.
Section 167(l)(b) of the Insurance Law'9 6 allows an injured party
to bring a direct action against an insurer where a judgment against its
insured within the policy terms and limits remains unpaid thirty days
after notice of entry is served on the insured or his attorney and the
insurer.
In Brown v. Reid,1 7 after denying the defendants' motion to vacate
a default judgment entered against the owner and the operator of a
vehicle which struck the plaintiffs' vehicle from behind, the Supreme
Court, Nassau County, held that participation of insurance carriers in
the defense of the primary litigation obviated the need for a separate
section 167 proceeding. 198 Reasoning that the essential ingredients of
stroyed, and thus comes squarely within the Fuentes exception of a special situation demanding prompt action.
The filing of a notice of pendency under CPLR 6501 is constructive notice of the
pendency of an action in which the judgment demanded would affect the title to, or the
possession, use or enjoyment of, real property. No application need be made to a court as
a condition precedent to the filing of the notice of pendency. While the notice of pendency
technically does not restrain the conveyance of real property, it serves as a severe deterrent
to a prospective buyer, and thus constitutes a significant limitation of the defendant's right
to free alienation of his property. Fuentes requires notice of a hearing before the defendant
is "deprived of any significant property interest . .. ." 407 U.S. at 82 (emphasis added).
While constructive notice is given by the filing of a notice of pendency, no opportunity to
challenge the action at a hearing exists prior thereto. Absent extraordinary circumstances,
a broad reading of Fuentes would seem to require that the defendant be given an opportunity to be heard prior to the filing of a notice of pendency.
196 N.Y. INS. LAW § 167(l)(b) (McKinney 1966).
1'7 72 Misc. 2d 237, 339 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972).
198 Two insurers, the defendant-owner's carrier and the Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (MVAIC). representing his uninsured driver, were involved in
the litigation from the beginning. The former disclaimed liability on the basis of the
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such a proceeding -judgment
against the defendants within the
coverage limits and presence of and notice to the insurers- were already present,199 the court directed the plaintiffs and the insurers to
appear at a pretrial conference to file any remaining claims or defenses
as to coverage. 20 0 In incorporating the section 167 proceeding into the
instant forum, the court relied on CPLR 103(c), which empowers a
court having jurisdiction over the parties to make whatever order is
required for the proper prosecution of an action brought in the wrong
form, and GPLR 2001, which permits a court to correct a mistake at
any stage of an action if a party is not prejudiced thereby.201 It also
202
cited section 167's lack of procedural specifications.
While the transformation of the concluded negligence action into
a section 167 proceeding is novel, Brown is fair. Although, technically,
jurisdiction was not acquired over the insurers, realistically, they were
the real defendants in interest from the outset of the action. 203 Brown
raises a compelling issue as to the need for a costly separate proceeding
where an insurer has been present throughout litigation, particularly
where issues of coverage have been resolved.
owner's allegation of nonpermissive use by the driver. The MVAIC insisted that the default judgment settled the issue, inculpating the owner and his insurer.
109 Id. at 241, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 209. The court noted that there had been no claim that
the accident or injuries were excluded from policy coverage or that the policy was not in
effect when the accident occurred. See Jones v. Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co., 121 F.2d
761 (2d Cir. 1941).
200 The court decried the injustice of requiring the plaintiffs to bring "yet another
full bloom court action" (72 Misc. 2d at 242, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 210) where, "[w]ithout the
participation of the insurance companies, the entire action, including damages, would have
been decided on default." Id. at 240, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 209. But cf. Overhill Bldg. Co. v.
Delaney, 28 N.Y.2d 449, 271 N.E.2d 537, 322 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1971).
201But cf. Asphalt Pavers, Inc. v. Cosentino, 53 Misc. 2d 613, 279 N.Y.S.2d 630 (Dist.
Ct. Nassau County 1967) (essential element for correction under CPLR 2001 is jurisdiction
over parties).
202 72 Misc. 2d at 241, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 209.
There are no procedural guidelines prescribed by the statute, no special service, notice or jurisdictional requirements, and, therefore, the general rules applicable under the CPLR to declaratory judgment actions apply. A section 167 proceeding is designed only to protect injured plaintiffs....
Id., citing CPLR 103(c); CPLR 104; Jackson v. Citizens Cas. Co., 277 N.Y. 385, 390, 14
N.E.2d 446, 448 (1938).
203 In Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 311, 234 N.E.2d 668, 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d
633, 637 (1967), motion for reargumentdenied, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d
914 (1968), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 43 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 302, 341 (1968), the
Court stated:
Viewed realistically, the insurer., . is in full control of the litigation; it selects
the defendant's attorneys; it decides if and when to settle; and it makes all procedural decisions in connection with the litigation.
Cf. Brothers v. Burt, 27 N.Y.2d 905, 265 N.E2d 922, 317 N.Y.S.2d 626 (1970) (mem.);
Thrasher v. United States MLab. Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.2d 159, 225 N.E.2d 503, 278 N.Y.S.2d 793
(1967) (service of notice of entry on attorneys retained by carrier to defend its insured was
proper service on the carrier).

